Seminar IRH-ICUB
Consciousness and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Approach
convenor Dr. Diana Stanciu
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Date: Thursday, 12 July 2018, 17h
Place: IRH-ICUB (1 D. Brandza Str.), conference room

Dr Fabrizio Bigotti
University of Exeter - IRH-ICUB Visiting Professor

Fabrizio Bigotti is a historian and philosopher of science. He received his PhD at the University of Rome ‘La Sapienza’, in 2012, with a thesis on Renaissance Galenism and its influence on natural philosophy and experimentatation. He attended advanced courses at the Warburg Institute of London as ‘La Sapienza’ and as ‘Frances A. Yates’ Fellow (2012-2013) and has received fellowships from the Wellcome Trust (Medical Humanities Research Fellowship, 2015-2018), and the Folger Institute of Washington D.C. (2017) as well as other awards and grants (Edward Worth Library, Dublin; Society for the History of Alchemy and Chemistry; Scientific Instrument Society; Society for the Social History of Medicine). His research focuses particularly on the history of medicine and technology from the late-medieval to the early modern period with a special emphasis on the history of traditions (Aristotle, Galen, and Greek Science). He is currently visiting Research Fellow at the University of Exeter (UK) and Visiting Professor at the Institute for Research in the Humanities, University of Bucharest, where is working on a project on intensity and equilibrium in the early modern period.

Magnitude, Motion and Self-Perception in Aristotle

Sense perception is, according to Aristotle, the animals’ most distinctive faculty, and yet its philosophical analysis is loaded with inextricable difficulties. On the one hand, it seems to require, on the part of the subject, an active disposition to discern phenomena and to categorize them; on the other, it entails a form of passivity, insofar as, without external stimuli, sensory organs are not activated. To further complicate the issue, Aristotle defines ‘magnitude’ (megetos) as the real object of any sensations, although he describes its apprehension in the individual as a structural process, namely as ‘form’. Overall, defining magnitude as the proper object of perception presents certain problems, for instance: how can a physical magnitude constituted by parts be represented in a single intuition? What kind of representation is activated in the case of objects that are in motion? How are they perceived? And finally, why is that the sensory organs do not perceive themselves? By drawing from a variety of sources, and especially from the De anima and the Parva Naturalia, this lecture will present and discuss some of Aristotle’s puzzles about the sensory faculty and how they benefit from a comparison with his theories on motion and matter.